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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Ministry of Railway's Meeting for Planning and Surveying

1. Between 19 and 28 January 1953, the Chinese Communist Ministry of Railways held a meeting in Peiping of over 70 persons engaged in the planning and surveying of new railway lines. CHAO Chien-min (6392/0256/3046), the new Deputy Minister of Railways, presided at the meeting. Persons attending the meeting included CHAO Fei-k'o (6392/7378/0344), director of the Planning Bureau; the directors and political department heads of the Northeast, North, Southwest, Northwest, and Central and South China Planning Sub-Bureaus; and the directors of the Ministry's 18 Surveying Corps (tsung tui, 4920/7130). Soviet personnel invited to attend the meeting as advisers were: Ao-ni-shih-k'o-fu (1159/1441/4258/0668/1133), a bridge expert; Wa-k'o-lien-k'o (3907/4430/6647/4430), a geologist; Tau-pu-k'o-fu (4371/1580/0668/1133), an expert on stations and workshops; CH'ia-p'ia-no-fu (0595/0514/2139/6179/1133) and Sha-pu-li (3097/1580/6849), surveying experts; and Ming-szu-ch'ia-fu (2494/2448/0595/1133), an electrical expert.
2. The principal aims of the meeting were to prepare for the planning activity of 1953, to improve the quality of planning, to reorganize the planning units, and to determine the appropriate use of technical personnel.
3. At the start of the meeting, CHAO Chien-min commended the 11 Surveying Corps on its construction of the Yak'oshih (N 49-16, E 120-45) forest line under temperatures of 30 to 50 degrees below zero. CHAO criticized the 17 Surveying Corps in the construction of the T'ien-shui-ch'engtu line, because the corps' planning lagged behind the actual construction work. CHAO was particularly critical of the use by corps personnel of Anglo-American technology.
4. The meeting resolved to do the following in 1953:
 - a. Accomplish the Ministry's planning program set for 1953.

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- b. Improve the quality of planning through strengthening political leadership; emphasize the political character of planning; avoid over-emphasis on technology by encouraging public suggestions on planning; chart more alternative rail routes; make systematic and continuous study of the advanced Soviet experience in rail construction; and prevent the setting of unrealistic completion dates by encouraging the Planning Bureau, the Planning Sub-Bureaus, and the Surveying Corps not to accept assignments without first questioning the realism of the assignment.
 - c. Expand the Central and South China Planning Bureau by adding five planning offices for electricity, economic study, large bridges, factory building, and designs.
 - d. Achieve a more effective use of personnel through the transfer of ten technical cadres of the Planning Bureau to the Central and South China Planning Sub-Bureau, thirty technical cadres of the Planning Bureau to the North China Planning Sub-Bureau, and forty-five technical cadres of both the South-West and Northwest Planning Sub-Bureaus to the Central and South China Planning Sub-Bureaus; have the Planning Bureau and the Planning Sub-Bureaus establish short-term training classes for technical personnel; and conclude master-apprentice contracts in units below the level of surveying and planning corps in order to fill vacancies of technical personnel.
5. The meeting concluded with addresses by T'ENG Tai-yuan (3326/0108/6678), Minister of Railways; LU Cheng-ts'ao (0712/2973/2347), Deputy Minister of Railways; MAO I-sheng (5403/0110/2573), director of the Railways Research Institute; and WU Shih-en (0702/1102/1869), deputy director of the Capital Construction Bureau. Soviet advisers presenting technical reports at the conclusion of the meeting were: Wa-k'o-lien-k'o on Planning Organization and Geological Problems; Ch'ia-po-la-no-fu on Surveying and Planning Procedures; Sha-pu-li on Surveying and Planning Problems and Hydraulic Engineering; and Ming-szu-ch'ia-fu on Planning and Organizing the Electrical Services.

Plans for Correction of Defective Railway Construction

6. In late March the Ministry of Railways capital construction program, with the exception of the T'ien-shui-Ch'engtu Railway, was far behind schedule because of the failure of railway planning to keep pace with actual rail construction. Since the delay affected the progress of the five-year construction plan, the Finance and Economics Committee, Government Administration Council, reprimanded the responsible personnel in units directing the construction of the new lines, including CHAO Chien-min, and the heads of the Capital Construction Bureau, the Planning Bureau, and the New Railway Lines Engineering Bureau. The persons and offices were instructed to increase their activity in order to offset losses caused by the delay.
7. After receiving the instructions of the Committee of Finance and Economics, the Ministry organized an inspection team of 39 persons under CHAO Chien-min to investigate the planning of new lines, construction problems, effectiveness of units engaged in construction, and the organization, quality, and progress of the actual construction. Members of the inspection team included MA Tzu-ch'ing (7456/1311/0615), deputy director of the Capital Construction Bureau; LI Liang (7812/0081) deputy director of the Planning Bureau; WANG Chu-ch'ien (3076/5468/3383), deputy director of the New Railway Lines Engineering Bureau; and personnel of the Political Department of the Ministry of Railways and the National Committee of the Railway Labor Union. The team planned to proceed to Lanchou (N 36-03, E 103-41), Ch'engtu, Kueiyang (N 26-35, E 106-43), and Wuhan. At Wuhan the team planned to investigate the work of the Wuhan Large Bridge Engineering Bureau.

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8. In early April the Ministry of Railways planned to assign supervisory engineers to each of the following engineering departments of the Capital Construction Bureaus: bridges, subways, railway lines, house construction, water supply, heating system, message communications, signalling, mechanics, and electric power.
9. The Ministry, recognizing that defective railway construction had frequently not been apparent until after the completion of a new railway, designated the following responsibilities for the supervisory engineers:
 - a. Assure adequate technical planning in construction.
 - b. Assure adherence to technical standards and engineering regulations.
 - c. Determine whether the construction unit was properly organized and that the methods used in construction were accurate and safe.
 - d. Assure the proper use of materials.
 - e. Determine total construction cost on the basis of the work already completed.
 - f. Determine whether the construction, when completed, was acceptable as to quality, and adherence to specifications and technical planning.

Poor Construction of T'ienhsui-Lanchou Railway Bridge

10. On 10 April 1953, less than six months after the opening of the T'ienhsui-Lanchou Railway, 66 arches of the cement bridge between Kanku (N 34-46, E 105-07) and Tinghsi (N 35-35, E 104-26) were cracked. This cracking resulted from errors committed by LI Te-chin (2621/1795/2516), an engineer of the Northwest Trunk Line Engineering Bureau and designer of the bridge, in calculating the support force needed by the bridge span. A Ministry investigation showed that although LI was qualified in skill and experience, he was not familiar with Soviet techniques in rail construction. LI, in determining the strength of the bridge spans, neglected to multiply figures converted from meters to feet by the given multiplier, 3.28. This error resulted in the inadequate use of steel reinforcements. In determining the shearing stress, LI followed the Anglo-American system and based his calculations for the shearing stress on the use of concrete. This procedure also weakened the bridge's support capacity.
11. In mid-April the Northwest Railway Engineering Bureau placed wooden sleepers to form battlements under the framework of the 66 arches. The bureau was also preparing to dismantle the bridge and rebuilt it. The loss caused by the defective bridge, including the cost of rebuilding the bridge and losses from the interruption of traffic, was expected to total more than JMP 50,000,000,000.
12. The Ministry of Railways planned to construct eleven railways in 1953, including the following three lines started in 1952: the T'ienhsui (N 34-36, E 105-28) - Ch'engtu (N 30-40, E 104-04) line; the Lanchou (N 36-03, E 103-41) - Chiayukuan (N 39-49, E 98-18) line, and the Fengtai (N 39-51, E 116-17) - Shach'eng (N 40-23, E 115-29) line. The eight remaining railways included the following:
 - a. Huaijou (N 40-16, E 116-37) - Changte (N 40-59, E 117-52) Railway.
 - b. Paotou (N 40-36, E 110-03) - Yinch'uan (N 38-28, E 106-19) Railway.
 - c. Yak'oshih (N 49-16, E 120-45) - Forest Industry Bureau at T'uliho (0956/6849/3109), the Ya-Lin Railway.
 - d. Aihun (N 49-59, E 127-28) - Peianchen (N 48-14, E 126-22) Railway.
 - e. Lungch'ang (N 29-21, E 105-16) Kueiyang (N 26-35, E 106-43) Railway.
 - f. Kueiyang - Kueiting (N 26-36, E 107-12) Railway.

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13. The Ministry of Railways planned to build five lines for specific defense and economic requirements. These lines were distinct from the eleven lines cited above and included the construction of three new lines. Each of these five lines was to be fifty kilometers or less in length and would serve as branch rail lines to mining areas, factories, barracks, and military bases.

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